',K.: Arts
and For
	Autumn
pp, 142
, and Cotmn Prrr , 23-25.
. (North
'port for
	Screen
rMMS 24
enerated ~esearch
mmingin
:r gener'CHI Re
Towards mming",
Creative ified or J,Brunel )'(1973)
NumiHm U niver
Computational Art
W v.llU' hM th, u"' of, compu", foe th,
	I'3.l!Dd music? The ultimate answer to this question
	:=-e5-om those practicing the arts. For each form of
;a':' ;::t:lll5""ft" might be different. Although I feel inclined -~::IWtJ?inion 'right away, based upon my experience ~ =..o...u.. music, I would rather tackle this query by ~~iJad., reflecting on the possible uses of the com~-~3ItS.. 
:::-s=;irin many branches of scientific endeavor the use . = ~ has known significant growth. Can a simi-"
~ ~ ~ expected for the use of computers in the arts? .~ ~-~ ibere are many differences between the use of :at ~inscience and the use of the computerin art. ~ - ~ experiments are not as likely to be put into ~,~ Zi. for instance, the experiments of the exact
.,	""'"- :::.eover, whereas the goal or specification of the
~:r-~~ clear in a scientific enterprise, one might .-:: ~~ ~ able to_state a goal or criterion that must be ]lE: =c=~c enterprise.
- ...~ ~ consider all possible uses of the computer in -=r: ~ -ill concentrate on a specific branch of Com~ ~ _~cial Intelligence. Artificial Intelligence .~ ~ our question since it is concerned with model.iiIE: -=i..:I!pIementing functions that are thought to be in~ ~~ this preference I state my first presuppoSIIIU':.. ~ behavior is intelligent behavior. Although ~ ~ ~ results of Artificial Intelligence are controver... -=:'i>- ~"'..e of science has known some generally rec
~ ~.	, for instance in the field of computer
~
~ .:;;,.~ .!nrelligence differs from other branches of G---=. Science in that it is expressly concerned with
~..~ allDpUting'. This is exemplified in the research ~~~ amomated reasoning or computational logic, ~ ~ investigating to what extent and how proof ~1L..~{2Il be effectively mechanized. The example of
-- ~	I logic is of interest since, although it never at
~ .3:!f ~ of providing procedures for discovering ~--::::.:;. :it has resulted in effective proof-verification pro~ ElL :ogic-based programming languages. Another ~~ aod significant application of automated rea~ zrlmiques can be found in expert systems, which
#t ~ becoming of interest in real-life situations.
~ ~ - "5 iD our question, "What value has the use of the J'- -- in me visual arts and music?", I note that there #It ~~ to phrase this question. For instance, it can
jr	Id as "What possible uses does the computer
,~ I~~~ But an inventory is not what I am primarily
	~in.. Rather, I would like to take it as querying the
~~,.".. uC annfrutational art, stressing the analogy with
~ ~-_ematics and Computer Science. P,O. Box 4079,1009 AB --~-'ds
~.:.oIIIIi(;gs&
:=3ii:~
-~~ x..?med in Great Britain,
~:!-- ~.OO
-'--.mmm."'''""JIIIT'
~ -.Jlllml
ABSTRACT
A. Eliiins
, The author conducts a simple
thought experiment investigating the existence and scope of 'computational art': the utilization of the computer in the visual arts and music. In the experiment he sets the task of constructing an artifact that is capable of producing works of art. Since it appears that the artifact needs at least the capability of imagination, he queries the nature of images and imagery and argues that imagination is strongly intentional. Next he introduces the concept of notational systems, since they seem to govern the artistic activity of (not exclusively) machines. Confronted with the question of whether we are able to develop a computational analogue for taste, he finds that notational systems prove to be necessary for mediating the method of production of an artwork and the appraisal of its artis. tic value. Furthermore, the author shows that there are certain epistemological limits to the creativity of an imaginative device. Although the outcome of this hypothetical construction task clearly denies the possibility of an autonomously creative artifact, there seems to be no reason to worry about the opportunities for computational art: the computer appears to be a unique tool in exploring the possibilities of artistic production, guided by artists.
computational logic: to what extent can artistic behavior be automatetP. Answering this question in its full depth is almost impossible. Therefore, I have chosen to follow a very particular method-constructing a creative artifact, a machine that is autonomously capable pf producing art. This hypothetical engineering task is not of a practical nature, though. I will not deal with t!le pragmatics of constructing an artistic device, but rather with the philosophical issues involved: those concerning imagination and taste. In other words, this thought experiment will function as a vehicle for developing the argument concerning the possibility and scope of computational art: the approaches to the visual arts and music that involve the use of a computer in some essential way,
The plan of this essay is as fol
lows: I investigate the possibility of mechanizing the process of imagination by using techniques from Artificial Intelligence. Then I introduce notational systems as a means to formalize the production of art. I will here raise the question whether notational systems are appropriate for the visual arts. Finally, I.will assess whether our device is creative. To this end I will consider the possibility of imple
menting taste, since I re~k of mechanizing crea
tivity to be dependent o'n the mechanization of taste.
No knowledge of Artificial Intelligence or the philosophy of art is presupposed, although it would certainly aid in appreciating the argument.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN IMAGINATIVE ARTIFACT
I have set the task of constructing an artifact that has the ability to imagine things, people or perhaps other artifacts and is also capable, as an artist, of producing images that can be appreciated by other people or artifacts. More specifically, I ask the question "How do we program a computer to behave like an artist?"
The reason for choosing a computer for our engineering task instead of any other mechanical device is that the computer is a device with universal computational power. If art can be automated, then it can be automated by using a computer. The physical nature of the device we intend to pro
LEONARDO, Electronic Art Supplemental Issue, pp. 21-25, 1988
21

:U .K.: Arts
e and For'5 Autumn i) pp. 142
ity and Coltumn PT(}'po 23-25.
ng (North
upport for le Screen
IJMMS 24
generated I Research
ramming in
iter generJTCHI Re
e Towards 'amming",
,e Creative ,lified or 70,Brunel ,6'(1973)
le Numbers ;h Univer
Computational Art
W, mu' h~ cl" "" uf a wmpu", fm the
~ 2fiS and music? The ultimate answer to this question ~0Jme fiom those practicing the arts. For each form of :;£ ~ 2!lSWer might be different. Although I feel inclined ~ =r DIP. opinion right away, based upon my experience ~ d'anonic music, I would rather tackle this query by ~2.5it'p back, reflecting on the possible uses of the com
~Z ~ arts.	~
~, in many branches of scientific endeavor the use
~ 3t amtputer has known significant growth. Can a simi- "
4. ~	ili be expected for the use of computers in the arts?
~~~i there are many differences between the use of = ~ in science and the use of the computer in art. ::L r ailsric experiments are not as likely to be put into
	~... as, for instance, the experiments of the exact
~ Aoreover, whereas the goal or specification of the :::- =isusually clear in a scientific enterprise, one might '!. ~ be able to state a goal or criterion that must be = =2!!l artistic enterprise.
: 4: DOl consider all possible uses of the computer in ~ ~ "ill concentrate on a specific branch of Com~~: Artificial Intelligence. Artificial Intelligence .= ~ iC our question since it is concerned with model~Bli.BpIementing functions that are thought to be inF-""~ '.'.1th this preference I state my first presuppo~ ~ ~ behavior is intelligent behavior. Although '"= :£;:3e results of Artificial Intelligence are controverJ:O... ~discipline of science has known some generally rec
~ ~s, for instance in the field of computer =
~ :nieIligence differs from other branches of =-~ Science in that it is expressly concerned with ~ ~~ mmputing'. This is exemplified in the research
	c;...~-;rn automated reasoning or computational logic,
oc:.L::. ~~ investigating to what extent and how proof ~.~ Gm be effectively mechanized. The example of
~-~~~ logic is of interest since, although it never at~ :3 goal of providing procedures for discovering ~ ~ ~ has resulted in effective proof-verification proxz::.. .-;;. :ogic-based programming languages. Another ~ and significant application of automated rea~ ~ues can be found in expert systems, which
	- _":"~Iy becoming of interest in real-life situations.
'i.=~ ID our question, "What value has the use of the
~ ~. iD me visual arts and music?", I note that there
~ ~	;re; to phrase this question. For instance, it can
:r- ---~ as "What possible uses does the computer -~ .E: ~ ans?" But an inventory is not what I am primarily
---	;n. Rather, I would like to take it as querying the
-.-0	uf wmputational art, stressing the analogy with
	.:aia ~-~ematics and Computer Science, P.O. Box 4079, 1009 AB
-- 'DIr"'iC&oerlands
	~ l!I68.
~~-~
... --
~""'=	x.. "tilted in Great Britain.
~~ ~~-OO
ABSTRACT
A. Eliiins
. The author conducts a simple
thought experiment investigating the existence and scope of 'computational art': the utilization of the computer in the visual arts and music. In the experiment he sets the task of constructing an artifact that is capable of producing works of art. Since it appears that the artifact needs at least the capability of imagination, he queries the nature of images and imagery and argues that imagination is strongly intentional. Next he introduces the concept of notational systems, since they seem to govern the artistic activity of (not exclusively) machines. Confronted with the question of whether we are able to develop a computational analogue for taste, he finds that notational systems prove to be necessary for mediating the method of production of an artwork and the appraisal of its artistic value. Furthermore, the author shows that there are certain epistemological limits to the creativity of an imaginative device. A~ though the outcome of this hypothetical construction task clearly denies the possibility of an autonomously creative artifact, there seems to be no reason to worry about the opportunities for computational art: the computer appears to be a unique tool in exploring the possibilities of artistic production, guided by artists.
computational logic: to what extent can artistic behavior be automatear Answering t~is question in its full depth is almost impossible. Therefore, I have chosen to follow a very particular method-constructing a creative artifact, a machine that is autonomously capable of producing art. This hypothetical engineering task is not of a practical nature, though. I will not deal with t!:te pragmatics of constructing an artistic device, but rather with the philosophical issues involved: those concerning imagination and taste. In other words, this thought experiment will function as a vehicle for developing the argument concerning the possibility and scope of computational art: the approaches to the visual arts and music that involve the use of a computer in some essential way,
The plan of this essay is as fol
lows: I investigate the possibility of mechanizing the process of imagination by using techniques from Artificial Intelligence. Then I introduce notational systems as a means to formalize the production of art. I will here raise the question whether notational systems are appropriate for the visual arts. Finally, I will assess whether our device is creative. To this end I will consider the possibility of imple
menting taste, since I re~k of mechanizing crea
tivity to be dependent on the mechanization of taste.
Np knowledge of Artificial Intelligence or the philosophy of art is presupposed, although it would certainly aid in
appreciating the argument.	\
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN IMAGINATIVE ARTIFACT
I have set the task of constructing an artifact that has the ability to imagine things, people or perhaps other artifacts and is also capable, as an artist, of producing images that can be appreciated by other people or artifacts. More specifically, I ask the question "How do we program a computer to behave like an artist?"
The reason for choosing a computer for our engineering task instead of any other mechanical device is that the computer is a device with universal computational power. If art can be automated, then it can be automated by using a computer. The physical nature of the device we intend to pro
LEONARDO, Electmnic Art Supplemental Issue, pp. 21-25, 1988
21
-	J,lll,

Computational Art
"W, ",,1o, hM the 0"' of, compo"" fo, the
~ aB and music? The ultimate answer to this question :=:IiiO.lIIIDe teom those practicing the arts. For each form of ;;r ~ ~er might be different. Although I feel inclined := ~ ID"' opinion right away, based upon my experience ~ dearonic music, I would rather tackle this query by ~ZSiep back, reflecting on the possible uses of the com:
~- ibe arts.	/
:=..~. in many branches of scientific endeavor the use ~ ~ mmputer has known significant growth. Can a simi- "
~=- ~ be expected for the use of computers in the arts? ~ ~~Iu there are many differences between the use of ~ ~rin science and the use of the computer in art. ~ .:[".ir.isric experiments are not as likely to be put into ~ <!S,. for instance, the experiments of the exact
or	=,,< :Joreover, whereas the goal or specification of the
"%"" ~is usually clearin a scientific enterprise, one might ~ ~ be able to state a goal or criterion that must be
::DE :a	artistic enterprise.
- ..:.: 110{ consider all possible uses of the computer in ~ am ",ill concentrate on a specific branch of Com~SoaIre: Artificial Intelligence. Artificial Intelligence
~	~ iD our question since it is concerned with model
~.-:: 81pIementing functions that are thought to be in?-""--.,.- "".1th this preference I state my first presuppoE:.':.. zasoc behavior is intelligent behavior. Although ~ ::£ ~ results of Artificial Intelligence are controver
	..;;:::;.ok:ipline of science has known some generally rec
~ ~s, for instance in the field of computer ~
~~ futelligence differs from other branches of ~~ Science in that it is expressly concerned with
",=.:::-': aJDlputing'. This is exemplified in the research ~~ antomated reasoning or computational logic, 'IiC--:: ~ investigating to what extent and how proof :r- ~ can be effectively mechanized. The example of
	-	...;. ~	' logic is of interest since, although it never at
~ ~ goal of providing procedures for discovering ::!!;:' ~ Ii has resulted in effective proof-verification pro
x;;;z... z.; ~c-based programming languages. Another ""':--.Z:""III and significant application of automated rea~ £'tlmiques can be found in expert systems, which
~ == ~ """;'ogly becoming of interest in real-life situations.
~"""L';''g to our question, "What value has the use of the
	::l ;0 me visual arts and music?", I note that there
~ ..' --- -rays to phrase this question. For instance, it can z :8IFr"""'iioOOd as "What possible uses does the computer ~:B.~:;ms?" But an inventory is not what I am primarily
	~m.. Rather, I would like to take it as querying the
~~ of computational art, stressing the analogy with
Arts
For
umn
.42
CoPro
25.
,nh
for een 524
lted Lrch
.gin
1erRe
"cls 19",
tive
or .nel 73)
:hers
ver
	~ :o..r- ~Iatltematics and Computer Science. P.O. Box 4079, 1009 AB
-- ~ x..merlands	\
	~ oI!& 1988.
~,~~
~4= x.. Pri1ted in Great Britain.
~~ ~.OO
A. Eliims
. The author conducts a simple
thought experiment investigating the existence and scope of 'computational art': the utilization of the computer in the visual arts and music. In the experiment he sets the task of constructing an artifact that is capable of producing works of art. Since it appears that the artifact needs at least the capability of imagination, he queries the nature of images and imagery and argues that imagination is strongly intentional. Next he introduces the concept of notational systems, since they seem to govern the artistic activity of (not exclusively) machines. Confronted with the question of
. whether we are able to develop a computational analogue for taste, he finds that notational systems prove to be necessary for mediating the method of production of an artwork and the appraisal of its artistic value. Furthermore, the author shows that there are certain epistemological limits to the creativity of an imaginative device. AI. though the outcome of this hypothetical construction task clearly denies the possibility of an autonomously creative artifact, there seems to be no reason to worry about the opportunities for computational art: the computer appears to be a unique tool in exploring the possibilities of artistic production, guided by artists.
computational logic: to what extent can artistic behavior be automaterP. Answering t~is question in its full depth is almost impossible. Therefore, I have chosen to follow a very particular method--constructing a creative artifact, a machine that is autonomously capable of producing art. This hypothetical engineering task is not of a practical nature, though. I will not deal with tl,1e pragmatics of constructing an artistic device, but rather with the philosophical issues involved: those concerning imagination and taste. In other words, this thought experiment will function as a vehicle for developing the argument concerning the possibility and scope of computational art: the approaches to the visual arts and music that involve the use of a computer in some essential way,
The plan of this essay is as fol
lows: I investigate the possibility of mechanizing the process of imagination by using techniques from Artificial Intelligence. Then I introduce notational systems as a means to formalize the production of art. I will here raise the question whether notational systems are appropriate for the visual arts. Finally, I 'will assess whether our device is creative. To this end I will consider the possibility of imple
menting taste, since I re)5~k of mechanizing crea
tivity to be dependent on the me<;hanization of taste.
No knowledge of Artificial Intelligence or the philosophy of art is presupposed, although it would certainly aid in appreciating the argument.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN IMAGINATIVE ARTIFACT
I have set the task of constructing an artifact that has the ability to imagine things, people or perhaps other artifacts and is also capable, as an artist, of producing images that can be appreciated by other people or artifacts. More specifically, I ask the question "How do we program a computer to behave like an artist?"
The reason for choosing a computer for our engineering task instead of any other mechanical device is that the computer is a device with universal computational power. If art can be automated, then it can be automated by using a computer. The physical nature of the device we intend to pro
LEONARDO, Electronic Arl Supplemental Issue, pp. 21-25, 1988
21